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The editors of the Nova Law Journal have invited me to comment
upon the responses that were received to my preliminary foray into the
applicability of constitutional norms to nuclear weapons. I am happy to
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The editors of the Nova Law Journal have invited me to comment
upon the responses that were received to my preliminary foray into the
applicability of constitutional norms to nuclear weapons. I am happy to
do so.1 At the outset, I should like to express my deep appreciation to
those who took time from their busy schedules to write responses, as
well as the editors of this Journal for making the symposium possible.
It is, I believe, the first attempt by a legal periodical to tackle from a
constitutional standpoint what by all odds is the overriding moral and
political (and thus constitutional) question of the day.
Lawyers of whatever specialty have until quite recent times ig-
nored the problems attendant to the manufacture, storage, deployment
and possible-even probable-use of weapons that threaten the very
fabric of civilization as we know it. Now, however, two groups of law-
yers have been formed--one with Boston headquarters and the other
centered in New York City; members of the American Bar Associa-
tion, as well as other bar associations, are beginning to focus upon the
growing peril. That is all to the good: lawyers, as Professor Levinson
suggests, can play an important role in the developing dialogue. They
exemplify in modern version what Samuel Johnson said long ago: "De-
pend upon it, Sir, when any man knows he is to be hanged in a fort-
night, it concentrates his mind wonderfully." 2 For the first time since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were all but obliterated in August, 1945, the
minds of lawyers-some but far from all of them-are beginning to
concentrate upon what Jonathan Schell has called "the fate of the
earth."
1. Although mention will be made of several responses, this rejoinder is general
in nature. It seeks to extend the argument, rather than to comment upon each of the
responses in detail.
2. 6 J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 309 (W. Crocker ed. 1846)
(1st ed. London 1791).
3. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
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The need, as Professor Dunne adumbrates, is for a "mutational
change"4 in our modes of thinking about constitutions and constitution-
alism. If, as Paul Freund once observed, the Supreme Court is a theme
that forces lawyers to become philosophers,5 the very existence of nu-
clear weapons forces everyone, including lawyers, to think deeply about
the nature of American constitutionalism. Professor Ball tells us that
when Congress was delegated the "power to declare war," it did not
include "the power to declare Armageddon."' Indeed, it does not. Nor
does the President have such a power, now that he, because of long-
standing Congressional ineptitude and pusillanimity, has become the
person who can precipitate a nuclear holocaust. True enough, the Presi-
dent has the ability to engage in nuclear war, either by responding to
external attack or by use of a first strike, but if constitutionalism means
anything it must be taken to mean that such an ability cannot be
equated with constitutional propriety. As Professor Jenkins reminds us,
the central concept of raison d'etat becomes irrelevant and inapplicable
with nuclear weaponry, simply because the survival of the nation-the
fundamental purpose of that silent constitutional principle--cannot be
guaranteed.7
When the deep-thinkers of the national security establishment
speak about nuclear war, they mention sooner or later what would be
an "acceptable" number of Americans killed in such a war. The figure
usually runs into tens of millions. Of course, the nuclear planners are
making provision for the safety of key figures in government. A com-
mand center has been hollowed out of a hillside in Virginia, furnished
with equipment and supplies and suitably protected. For ordinary
Americans a "civil defense" program is envisaged (some $4.3 billion is
allocated to it in the current budget). Cities will be evacuated, but no
one quite seems to know how, say, the residents of New York or any
other major city will survive. An official in the Pentagon has suggested
that everyone should get a shovel, dig a hole, cover it with a couple of
doors and throw three feet of dirt on top of it-after which a person or
a family presumably will huddle in the hole until danger ceases. The
4. Dunne, A Grenville Clark Hypothetical, 7 NOVA L.J. 167, 171 (1982).
5. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 1 (1949).
6. Ball, Nuclear War: The End of Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 53, 61 (1982).
7. Jenkins, Admirable Ends - Ineffective Means, 7 NOVA L.J. 127 (1982).
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absurdity of such a view requires no comment: It bespeaks a mind so
dulled by computerized war games and thinking about the unthinkable
that the person wallows in a swamp of consummate nonsense. Let no
one fail to see the point: there is no escape for most Americans should
nuclear war break out.
That does not mean, of course, that those who sit in positions of
political power do not today and did not in the past toy with the use of
nuclear weapons. To take the latter first, recently revealed documents
tell us how very close the United States was to using atomic bombs in
Indo-China as long ago as 1954-at the time when the French were
being defeated at Dienbienphu. 8 That they were not used, either by
American forces or by the French (who had obtained them from the
United States), came from a decision taken not on humanitarian
grounds but because of a fear of a worldwide public uproar. As for
today, in August, 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was
busily engaged in trying to stifle-through representations to the me-
dia-the fact that the Reagan administration was prepared to fight a
"protracted nuclear war."9 Small wonder, therefore, that the "dooms-
day clock" on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has
moved from seven to four minutes to midnight.
Professor McDowell believes that the idea of a living Constitution
"is ultimately at odds with the logic of the Contitution itself."10 He of
course has a full first amendment right to such a view. The fact that it
runs contrary to the vast majority of constitutional scholars will not,
and perhaps should not, deter him. How he can square his position with
the development of constitutional law in the almost two centures since
1789 remains completely mysterious. He misreads McCulloch v. Mary-
land,11 and seems to think that Chief Justice Marshall's allusion to
popular sovereignty in Marbury v. Madison12 is the ne plus ultra of
8. See Marder, When Ike Was Asked to Nuke Vietnam, Wash. Post, Aug. 22,
1982, at Cl, col. 1.
9. See Halloran, Weinberger Angered by Reports on War Strategy, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 1982, at B8, col. 3; Wilson, Weinberger Lobbies Editors on War Policy,
Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
10. McDowell, Nuclear Weapons: Unconstitutional or Just Unjust?, 7 NOVA.
L.J. 145, 146 (1982).
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
173 1
3
Miller: In Brief Rejoinder
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
1 74 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
understanding about "the" Constitution.13 That just ain't so. The ines-
capable point, it seems to me, is that the meaning of the Constitution
alters with the exigencies faced by succeeding generations of Ameri-
cans-but the words remain the same. Each generation of Americans
must undertake the task of writing its own constitution; that, at least, is
the clear and unmistakable teaching of history. Professor McDowell
does not like that; but he cannot gainsay it. The Constitution has al-
ways been relative to circumstances. To repeat Franz Neumann's point:
No society in recorded history has even been able to dispense with
political power. This is as true of liberalism as of absolutism, as
true of laissez-faire as of an interventionist state. No greater disser-
vice has been rendered to political science than the statement that
the liberal state was a "weak" state. It was precisely as strong as it
needed to be in the circumstances. It acquired substantial colonial
empires, waged wars, held down internal disorders, and stablilzed
itself over long periods of time. 4
The relevant "circumstance" today is the imminence of nuclear
holocaust. Those circumstances call, not for an expansion of govern-
mental power but for the development of means by which government,
in Madison's words, can be obliged "to control itself.1 5 Professor Mor-
ris suggests that a constitutional judgment should be made that nuclear
weapons "unreasonably jeopardize American well-being."' 6 That is the
language of due process, and opens still another argument for the ap-
plicability of constitutional norms to the circumstances that confront
US.
Professor Alfange asserts that the Duke Power7 case is relevant to
the nuclear weapon issue.' 8 I cannot agree with his conclusion; but
13. McDowell, supra note 10, at 147. For a preliminary inquiry into the meaning
of what the Constitution is, see Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, -
U. DAYTON L. REV. - (1983).
14. F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 8 (1957)
(emphasis added).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
16. Morris, The Constitution and Nuclear Defense, 7 NOVA L.J. 151, 164
(1982).
17. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
18. Alfange, Wisdom, Constitutionality, and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 7 NOVA
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would like to draw upon that Supreme Court decision, and particularly
the opinion of Judge McMillan in Carolina Environmental Study
Group v. United States Atomic Energy Commission9 which was re-
versed by the Court. Environmentalists in North Carolina challenged
the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, setting monetary limits
on the liability for damage resulting from a nuclear power plant. Judge
McMillan ruled the statute unconstitutional, stating that "the destruc-
tion of the property or the lives of those affected by nuclear catastrophe
without reasonable certainty that the victims will be justly compen-
sated" 20 violated the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed-unanimously. Where, then, does
that leave us? I maintain that we are left exactly where the plaintiffs
were on March 31, 1977 when Judge McMillan issued his opinion. The
two situations are not analogous. Chief Justice Warren Burger, speak-
ing for the Court, employed a limited standard of review in what he
perceived to be an economic regulation. He found that the Act was
neither arbitrary nor irrational; thus it "passe[d] constitutional mus-
ter."' 21 Burger also relied upon "an explicit congressional commitment
to take further action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event
that the $560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded."2 2 Surely Burger's
alleged "reasoning" is inapplicable to nuclear weapons. The point, as
Professor Morris tells us, is that the danger created by nuclear weap-
onry is of such enormity that Americans are being deprived of their
right to personal and psychic well-being.23
Nuclear weapons, accordingly, constitute an "anticipatory taking"
contrary to the fifth amendment and an "anticipatory" deprivation of
life, liberty and property without due process of law. Due process, Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter stated in 1950, "is that which comports with the
L.J. 75 (1982).
19. 431 F. Supp. 203 (1977). For further discussion of "anticipatory" depriva-
tion of life, liberty and property see Miller, The Constitutional Challenge of Nuclear
Weapons: A Note on the Obligation to Ward off Extinction, - BROOKLYN INT'L L. J.
-(1983).
20. Carolina Envtl. Study, Group, 431 F. Supp. at 222.
21. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 84.
22. Id. at 93.
23. Morris, supra note 16.
175 117:1982
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deepest notions of what is fair and right and just. '24 It means, in cur-
rent context and to adopt Judge McMillan's classification, that Ameri-
cans have a right to be free from both the immediate and the the po-
tential effects of nuclear weaponry. 5
The immediate effects are bad enough. Storage of bombs and nu-
clear waste present as yet insoluble problems of safety. Furthermore, as
Ruth Leger Sivard has concluded, increasingly vast sums are being
spent to purchase what may be an illusory sense of security at the price
of economic stagnation, repression, and poverty.28 I have elsewhere
sought to draw attention to the emergence of a new "constitution of
control";2 7 surely, nuclear weapons contribute to that development.
The potential effects are far worse. Drawing upon Judge McMil-
lan's opinion, the following conclusions seem to be beyond argument.
First, there is a high probability of nuclear war, coming either by
design or by accident.
Second, there is no escape from the impact of nuclear war.
Third, civil defense measures cannot possibly protect the residents
of any city in the United States.
Fourth, the risks involved in nuclear weaponry are not the types
that a responsible government places upon its citizens.
Fifth, there is no way that Americans can be compensated for
losses of life, liberty, or property.
Sixth, nuclear war will be the "last epidemic." There is no way
that the health services of the nation could take care of the casualties
of such a war.
Given those effects, the conclusion of an anticipatory violation of
the fifth amendment is unanswerable.
I do not, it is emphasized, wish to be placed in the position of one
who uses constitutional argumentation as "desperate legal acrobat-
24. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissentiIig). As
was his practice, Frankfurter did not divulge how he determined those "deepest notions
of what is fair and right and just." Id. Compare his concurring opinion in Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947).
25. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 431 F. Supp. at 209.
26. R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1981 (1982).
27. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITU-
TION OF CONTROL (1981).
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ics. ''28 The ideas presented may be new, but I do not think they are
foolish. If our modes of thiiking about constitutions and constitutional-
ism are to be changed, the basic requirement, in the words of Alexan-
der Pekelis, is to have
the will to discover the will to enlarge the tiny segment of the
world we know, the will to learn and to do better, the firm and
deepseated conviction that men may, again and again, in everyone's
lifetime, see "thin with distance, thin but dead ahead, the line of
unimaginable coasts.129
There may well be an "arrogance of humanism" 3°--the belief that hu-
mankind through the exercise of reason can control the future. Surely,
however, we have to act as if what humans do can make a difference,
as if they have the intelligence, the will, and the stamina to ward off
extinction.
A final note: calling nuclear weapons a constitutional problem does
not, of course, mean that they are ipsofacto not a political problem. As
Professors Alfange and McDowell note, those weapons should be dealt
with by the political process.31 My belief is that the courts, and specifi-
cally the Supreme Court, are deeply immersed in politics and, indeed,
would be quite meaningless unless seen as part of the political process.
Judges are important political actors-now, in the past, and certainly
in the future. Professor Judith Shklar has observed that the prevailing
ideology of lawyers is "legalism"-the notion that law is somthing sep-
arate and apart from the remainder of society.3 2 But, as any sociologist
of law knows, law and the state are closely intertwined. To call for a
political solution to the nuclear threat does not foreclose action by
courts. Quite the contrary. The Supreme Court sits as an authoritative
faculty of political theory and of social ethics. It can, should the Jus-
tices so wish, set standards toward which all Americans can aspire.33
28. Levinson, Book Review, Self-Evident Truths in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, 57 TEx. L. REv. 847, 858 (1979).
29. Pekelis, The Case for a Jurisprudence of Welfare, in LAW AND SOCIAL Ac-
TION I (M. Konvitz ed. 1950).
30. See D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM (1978).
31. See Alfange, supra note 18; McDowell, supra note 10.
32. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
33. It is worth special mention that the General Counsel of the Department of
1771In Brief Rejoinder7:1982
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On the other hand, as Professor Gerhard Casper has cogently ob-
served, "constitutional rules are authoritative regardless of whether
courts are able to interpret and enforce them.3 4 Congress and the Presi-
dent, Casper continues, ''must be ready to reconsider fundamental con-
stitutional policies and basic propositions of political theory. '3 5 So they
do. The Constitution is not d mere lawyers' document, not a plaything
(or workthing) of lawyers only. It is the vehicle of the nation's life. And
government officers, including the President, swear to "preserve, pro-
tect and defend the Constitution of the United States." 36 If that means
anything, and surely it is not mere brutumfulmen, it means cognizance
of and adherence to a constitutional duty to insure the preservation of
the nation and the values that they are embedded in the Constitution.
In the age of thermonuclear bombs, that can only mean the total elimi-
nation of such weapons wherever they may be. In sum, no useful pur-
pose is served by calling nuclear weaponry a "policy" question or a
problem of "politics," for all branches of government deal with policy
and politics. 37
Defense, William H. Taft, IV, acknowledges "the existence of the constitutional duty
to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the individ-
ual freedom and rights of Americans set out in the Constitutions." Taft, Letter from
the Government, 7 NOVA. L.J. 141, 143 (1982). One hopes that Mr. Taft's recognition
of such a constitutional duty is communicated to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the President - and that they agree that such a duty rests upon
their shoulders. I am, of course pleased to learn that my view on the existence of a
constitutional duty has drawn the approbation of a high government officer - who,
indeed, advances even more constitutional arguments than do I in support of such a
position. Mr. Taft's letter merits wide circulation.
34. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy; A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 473 (1976).
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
37. For discussion, see A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIvIsM:
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982); M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COM-
PARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, (1981); J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDI-
CIARY (1977); Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1979); Miller,
Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1104 (1982).
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